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The current UK government’s policies include headlong spending cuts and a far-
reaching restructuring of public provision. State welfare arguably contributes to 
political legitimacy and social stability, as well as to better social conditions and 
economic prosperity. The fact that current policies bear disproportionately on lower 
income groups may damage legitimacy. 
 
This article analyses a dataset covering 26 countries for more than two decades to 
show that spending cuts, privatisation and increases in poverty undermine legitimacy. 
It uses a direct measure of legitimacy in terms of the frequency of riots and political 
demonstrations and strikes rather than the usual indirect measures in terms of attitudes 
and trust in government. Findings in relation to the increased work-centredness of the 
benefit and labour market reforms are more equivocal: a stricter benefit regime may 











The UK’s government’s current strategy combines radical spending cuts with a 
restructuring of most areas of public provision. The immediate objective, as stated on 
the opening page of the 2010 Emergency Budget and repeated in 2011 is to reduce 
costs and hence the budgetary deficit (HMTreasury 2010, 1; 2011, 1). The new 
policies go far beyond this. As well as cutting state spending they will expand the role 
of non-state, especially for-profit, providers, make provision more diverse and tighten 
work incentives. Many commentators argue that generous and inclusive state welfare 
bolsters the legitimacy of government in unequal but democratic capitalist societies. 
The implication is that cuts and restructuring on the scale currently being pursued will 
tell in the opposite direction. Legitimacy is about the extent to which citizens accept 
the government’s authority. Most empirical work on legitimacy uses indirect 
measures to do with attitudes to and trust in government. This article considers a more 
direct approach using overt manifestations of dissent and rejection of authority such 
as riots, demonstrations and political strikes.  
 
The article falls into four sections which discuss the relationship between state 
welfare and political legitimacy, describe current policy changes in the UK and their 
impact, explore the relationship between reform and dissent across a number of 
countries using data from OECD Social Expenditure and other databases and the 
Comparative Democracies Time-Series dataset, and draw conclusions about the likely 
effect of current policy changes. The study uses cross-national data to examine the 
relationship between the policies now being pursued by the current UK government 
and disorder. Since the Economic Adjustment Programmes now being imposed on 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece by the IMF, EU and ECB share many features in 
common with UK reforms, the findings may have a broader relevance. The EU 
‘roadmap’ for economic recovery currently being finalised implies much closer 
economic surveillance for all member states (EC 2011). This suggests that it will 
become even more difficult for governments to increase spending in response to 
popular pressures. The political legitimacy of welfare states across Europe may come 
under even more intense pressure. 
 
Many factors other than welfare policy may lead to disorder. These include foreign, 
nuclear or environmental policies, the impact of international market changes in a 
globalised world, multicultural and ethnic minority policies and police tactics. Any 
empirical analysis that seeks to link overt dissent to policy changes is likely to 
encounter considerable ‘noise’ in the data. The relationship between disorder and 
welfare state reform is of interest to UK readers because we have experienced major 
riots and political demonstrations in the context of reforms (Guardian/LSE 2011) and 
because the full impact of the Coalition programme has not yet impacted on public 
provision and on the living standards of those on low incomes. This article seeks to 
demonstrate that it is possible to show that welfare state restructuring may contribute 
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to disorder, despite these problems. The article also contributes by exploring an 
empirical approach to welfare state legitimacy that goes beyond that of studies based 
on indirect measures such as attitudes. 
 
 
I. Legitimacy and Welfare  
Many scholars have argued that state welfare contributes to political legitimacy as 
well as to economic progress and the satisfaction of citizen needs in democratic 
capitalist societies. Legitimacy is to do with acceptance of the authority of 
government, and is central to the orderly operation of democracies (Weber 1964, 382). 
The Marxist tradition has identified two main roles for welfare states in capitalist 
societies. These are to do with reconciling ‘two basic and often mutually 
contradictory functions: accumulation and legitimation’ (O’Connor 1973, 9). The 
provision of welfare directly helps capital to expand because it ensures that a skilled, 
healthy and adequately-housed work force is available. It also makes an indirect 
contribution by helping to secure acceptance of the existing social order as fair, 
because it helps address needs that are not met by the operation of the market. Gough 
analyses the legitimation role of social welfare as ‘indirectly productive’ (1979).  
Offe’s work starts out from a more sociological perspective, analysing legitimation in 
relation to social order rather than economic production. He identifies a continuing 
tension in modern western societies between capitalism (based on inequality and 
competition) and welfare (based on respect for individuals and meeting need) and 
argues that neither side ‘would be prepared to abandon the welfare state’ because it 
‘performs essential and indispensable functions for the accumulation of capital as well 
as for the economic and social well-being of the working class’ (Offe, 2006, 75). 
Other writers make similar points: Williams sees the roles of the state as ‘maintaining 
political harmony, stability and social control’ (1989, 35, compare Lister 2010 61). 
Daly argues ‘not only does the welfare state shore up capitalism, but it legitimates it 
as well’ (2011, 69). 
Legitimacy is theoretically important because it links government activity in a 
democracy to social order and contributes indirectly to economic success. It is 
difficult to assess the relationship between particular policy stances and political 
legitimacy empirically. The theme of welfare state contributions to legitimacy has 
been explored quantitatively chiefly through work that relies on the indirect measures 
provided by attitude surveys (see Van Oorschott 2000; Rothstein 2005; Mau and 
Veghte 2007; Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby 2007; Svallfors 2010; Taylor-Gooby and 
Martin, 2010).  The main findings are that state welfare is in general popular, but that 
there is a persistent bias across all countries to stronger support for welfare that meets 
needs, and particularly those of deserving groups (Van Oorschott 2006). These 
arguments suggest that policies which conflict with these assumptions by cutting back 
on social spending or by harming the poor and vulnerable run the risk of damaging 
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the capacity of state welfare to contribute to legitimacy. However policies which 
favour deserving groups such as those that reinforce the work ethic may not 
necessarily have this effect. An important theme in recent analyses of welfare policy 
deals with the question of how governments can retrench on social spending and 
retain popularity. This concern underlies much of the debate about the emergence of a 
‘new politics of welfare’ (see Pierson 2001). As legitimacy and social stability come 
under increasing pressure, these issues are of even greater importance. 
Another strand in empirical work relates welfare policies more directly to the need to 
secure legitimacy. Piven and Cloward’s pioneering study Regulating the Poor (1993) 
analyzes poor relief as a strategy to maintain social order. The authors argue with 
substantial empirical and historical evidence, mainly from the US AFDC (now TANF) 
and related programmes such as food stamps, that ‘expansive relief policies are 
designed to mute civil disorder and restrictive ones to reinforce work norms’ (1993, 
xv). This argument has been extremely influential, but there appears to be relatively 
little UK work that relates benefit spending directly to disorder. This may well result 
from the fact that disorder tends to take place in specific localities. UK benefit rates 
are determined nationally and cannot respond to local pressures. Targeted inner city, 
urban renewal, social exclusion and neighbourhood programmes in the UK are often 
understood as emerging in response to threats of social unrest (see Power 2012, 20 for 
a review). 
More broadly, social scientists have sought to relate overall spending by national 
governments and by trans-national agencies to social order, mainly outside the world 
of developed welfare states. IMF interventions have been shown to impact on social 
stability in African (Morrison et al. 1994) and in developing countries more generally 
(Haggard et al. 1995). Ponticelli and Voth examine the effect of austerity programmes 
over the last 90 years across Europe and show a strong and consistent link between a 
broad measure of social unrest (including assassinations and attempted revolutions) 
and budget cuts (2011). In this article we seek to focus more precisely on changes in 
welfare state policy and examine their relationship with disorder of the kind that 
might be experienced within a modern welfare state.  
II. Welfare State Reform 
The data under discussion here refers to the period from 1980 to 2005, before the 
2007 crisis and subsequent recession. In this section we discuss current policy 
developments to identify the changes whose likely effect on legitimacy is of most 
interest. 
The policies of the 2010 coalition have been extensively discussed (IFS 2011, Yeates 
2011, Taylor-Gooby and Stoker 2011, Taylor-Gooby 2012). We can identify two 
main policy directions: cut-backs, to reduce spending and help the government 
achieve its primary budgetary objective of deficit reduction, and restructuring, with 
objectives that are less evident. The cuts include reductions in public spending for all 
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cash benefits, apart from first tier pensions, local government services and all capital 
programmes (including social housing, NHS and education). Current spending on the 
NHS and the schooling component of education is maintained in cash terms but 
affected by the continuing programmes of cuts and efficiency savings agreed 
previously. These cuts are the largest since the Geddes Axe in 1921-2 and to be 
achieved over the relatively short period of five years (for details see IFS 2011, 
Yeates et al. 2011). 
Cuts in taxes and cash benefits affect the top and bottom two deciles of the income 
distribution most severely. The impact of the (larger) cuts in spending on services in 
kind is controversial, but appears likely to impact most harshly on low-income groups 
(Brewer et al 2011). Further work shows that the cut-backs will disproportionately 
affect families with children, particularly those on low incomes, single parents and 
women (Crawford 2010; O’Dea 2010; Cooper 2010; Fawcett Society et al. 2011). 
The cut-backs are accompanied by a programme of restructuring affecting virtually 
every area of government. This includes the NHS (NHS Bill 2011), local government 
(Localism Act 2011), education (Education Bill 2011), child care, universities, cash 
benefits (Welfare Reform Bill 2011), the Employment Service and Employment 
Protection, and the Open Public Services programme (Cabinet Office 2011). The 
reforms contained within this programme are not yet fully implemented but appear to 
have three common features:  
- They expand the opportunities for non-state (mainly private commercial) 
agencies to take a greater role in provision, in the NHS, schooling, 
universities, pensions and employment and local government services. 
This effect is likely to be amplified by greater voluntary use of the private 
sector, as pressures on the NHS and on care services increase and as the 
automatic enrolment second-tier pension is implemented; 
- They ensure that provision is even more work-centred, most obviously in 
the Universal Credit programme, reform of the Employment Services and 
treatment of disabled people, but also impact of higher education fees on 
choice of courses, the proposed tightening of employment protection rules 
and the effect of lower benefits on incentives; and 
- They will lead to greater diversity both on an area basis and between client 
groups and providers, in health and social care, in local government 
standards and perhaps in benefit rates and state sector pay (PWC 2010, 
2011; LGA 2011; HoC 2011). 
 
There has been some discussion of a fourth common feature, a stronger role for the 
Third Sector as part of a ‘Big Society’ programme. The cuts in local and central 
funding for this sector, the reluctance of government to include it in current 
contracting out of services, the difficulties it experiences in offering common national 
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services and the mismatch between the areas in which third sector activity is 
concentrated and the areas of highest welfare need suggest this is unlikely to progress 
far (; Lyon and Sepulaveda 2009; CDF 2009; Heims et al. 2010; Breeze 2010; Mohan 
2011). 
The programme of combining restructuring with cuts has been discussed in terms of 
the politics of coalition building (Gamble 2011), the project of embedding the cuts so 
that (unlike previous episodes of cutback in the UK) they become permanent (Hood et 
al. 2010; Taylor-Gooby 2012) and the object of constructing a new political economy 
of welfare as part of a new UK growth model (Fairbairn and Irving 2011; Gough 2011; 
Hay and Wincott 2012). In this article we are more concerned with attempting to chart 
their likely impact on welfare state legitimacy, as assessed through social disorder. 
The outcomes of the Coalition reforms are likely to be as follows: 
 
- First, from the cut-backs: greater poverty and inequality (as cutbacks 
impact disproportionately on groups that are already disadvantaged); 
 
- Secondly, from the restructuring: a stronger role for the private sector and 
a smaller role for the state sector (as private business enters health and 
social care, higher education and local government services more 
vigorously); stronger work incentives (from tighter benefit rules, the 
payment-by-results Employment Service and a harsher employment 
regime); and greater variation in provision by area, social group and 
provider (as local state and private providers exert greater autonomy in 
health care, education and other services). 
 
III. Disorder and the impact of cuts and restructuring   
In this section we examine the impact of the kinds of policy directions that are being 
pursued by the UK Coalition government on political legitimacy, understood in the 
most basic terms as social order and disorder. Our research question is to do with the 
relationship between the kinds of welfare state reforms pursued as part of austerity 
packages across Europe, of which current UK policies provide a clear and well-
developed example, and social disorder. The above discussion generates the 
hypotheses that the following five factors tend to generate social disorder and damage 
the capacity of the welfare state to contribute to political legitimacy: 
- Spending cuts;  
- Privatisation; 
- Greater poverty; 
- A more work-centred benefit and labour market regime; and  
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- Greater variation in provision by place, social group and provider. 
Evidence that these factors damage social stability will suggest that the coalition 
policies are very likely to do so. 
There are a number of practical problems in obtaining good quality data, in 
conceptualising and operationalizing legitimacy in terms of disorder and in measuring 
the five policy outcomes of interest in current policies identified above. It has not 
been possible to gather the data in a suitable form to include the last-mentioned in the 
analysis reported here. 
Data sources 
The dependent variable and contextual data are derived from material gathered for the 
Cross-National Time-series Dataset (Banks 2011). This dataset has been updated and 
is made available by Professor Norris as part of the Democracy Time-Series Dataset. 
The data covers 191 nations between 1975 and 2008 and for our purposes includes 
material on major riots, political strikes and political demonstrations gathered from 
the pages of the New York Times, checked to eliminate duplications and corrected 
from other sources. The data was assembled by one of the leading scholars in the 
field. It is widely regarded as providing a good quality, consistent source of cross-
national information and was used as the basis for the book Driving Democracy 
(Norris 2009). The analysis reported here covers the nations for which material is 
available that can conveniently be used to represent the policies relevant to legitimacy 
and disorder identified above. This restricts the analysis to 26 countries with 
established welfare states for the period 1980 to 2005
i
. 
The dependent variable: conceptualising legitimacy as disorder 
Overt manifestations of collective dissent are relatively rare in the civic life of the 
established democratic welfare states under consideration. The data base includes 
large political demonstrations and strikes directed against government policies, and 
major riots
ii
, as well as assassinations, revolutions, purges and political coups. There 
are too few of the last four in the countries and time-period under consideration to 
permit successful analysis. In order to maximise the use of the data a combined 
variable summing riots, demonstrations and strikes was generated. There are 141 
instances of these events at the six time-points covered by the data on welfare state 
policies (1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005). 
One issue is that while these events may reasonably be said to indicate strong 
dissatisfaction and the strikes and demonstrations are limited to large events in 
opposition to government policies, they do not necessarily reflect concern about social 
policies and welfare state restructuring. Political strikes may be directed at industrial 
policy and demonstrations at a range of issues (green and immigration policies for 
example). Riots may reflect policing practices. The coding excludes foreign policy 
related demonstrations, so that the major anti-war rallies or the demonstrations against 
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closed borders in Eastern Europe of recent years are omitted. Other imperfections 
remain. The material available can only offer an exploratory broad-brush analysis. It 
should be noted that many of the issues which are included and are not directly related 
to welfare are likely to be part of the market-centred approach to public policy with 
which we are concerned. Examples would be public disorder or a political 
demonstration or strike in response to a refusal by government to support particular 
industries or against restrictive trade union legislation or rejection of fair trade or 
public health legislation. 
The independent variables 
Public and private social expenditure variables are derived from the OECD Social 
Expenditure database (OECD 2011a).  This covers 34 countries, reporting at five year 
intervals. The 26 on which there was reasonably good data coverage from 1980 to 
2005 and which have established welfare states are included in this analysis. This 
material covers public and private social spending as a percentage of GDP. It can be 
used to represent changes in welfare state spending and privatisation. Other OECD 
data sources provide material on the percentage of the population living below the 60 
per cent of median income poverty line (OECD 2011c) and employment protection 
(OECD 2011b). This is used as a measure of the work-centredness of public policy. 
No convenient measure was identified for the greater fragmentation of provision 
within nations by provider, social group and area. This factor was omitted from the 
analysis. 
The preceding section identified processes of change: spending cut-backs, and 
increases in poverty, privatisation and work-centredness. The independent variables 
used in the analysis are the five year changes in the relevant measures, for example 
public or private social spending changes between 1980 and 1985, 1985 and 1990, 
1990 and 1995, 1995 and 2000 and 2000 and 2005. The fact that the model relates 
manifestations of disorder to policy changes during the previous five-years helps to 
address the problem of taking account of the implementation of major reforms over 
time. 
The privatisation variable used includes total mandatory and voluntary private 
spending. The reform programme is likely to have effects in both areas. It will expand 
the role of private providers for NHS and local government services and in education. 
It will also impose auto-enrolment in second-tier private pensions and damage 
standards in a number of state services through harsh spending cuts, so that private 
alternatives become more attractive to those who can afford them. Analysis using a 
variable restricted to changes in mandatory private spending produces similar results. 
The public spending variable is the OECD measure of total public social spending 
across all benefits and services for all population groups (old age, survivors, 
incapacity, health, family, active labour market programmes, unemployment, housing 
and other social programmes). A separate analysis was carried out using a variable 
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adjusted to omit spending on pensions, incapacity, survivors and health care, since 
these areas are to some extent protected from cuts in the UK. The adjusted variable 
focuses attention on the groups identified in the IFS and WBG analyses quoted earlier 
as most severely affected by the reforms, those of working age and particularly 
women and children in families. It produced similar results. This suggests that it is the 
scale and not the detail of public social spending that affects collective social 
behaviour in a broad-brush analysis of the kind reported here. 
Poverty is measured as the relative poverty rate before taxes and transfers at the 60 
per cent of median income poverty line. The work-centredness of national policies is 
more difficult to measure since it includes both quantitative aspects, such as the level 
and duration of entitlement to out-of-work benefits that forms the basis of Esping-
Andersen and Scruggs’ decommodification measures (see Scruggs 2006) and also 
qualitative aspects, to do with conditionality, labour market interventions and the 
management of unemployed people. Decommodification measures are only available 
for 18 of the 26 countries for the period from 1971 to 2002. 
A convenient and consistent comparative measure of employment protection is 
available from OECD (2011b). The Employment Protection Index draws together 
information on the ease with which individual workers can be dismissed, the costs to 
the employer of collective dismissals and the level of regulation of temporary 
contracts. It reflects the extent to which legislation and government interventions 
impose flexibility on the labour market. While this does not equate to the work-
centredness of benefit rules, it goes hand in hand with it, since the object of the new 
benefit rules is to increase labour market flexibility by ‘helping people to move into 
and progress in work’ (DWP 2011). The current UK reforms include a re-
categorisation of contracts that have lasted between one and two years from 
permanent to temporary which will reduce the country’s score on the index. 
The analysis: stage I 
The analysis proceeded in two stages, first examining the dependent variable and the 
way in which it related to the independent variables specified in the discussion above 
and then constructing a regression model to explore the relationship between the 
various factors in combination and social disorder. 
Chart 1 shows the distribution of scores on the disorder variable by year. There is 
clearly considerable variation over time, with a peak in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. The correlation between disorder and year remains significant at the five per 
cent level when controlled by nation, indicating that it is not the result of activity in a 
particular country but more generalised. Further exploration shows that riots and 
political strikes and demonstrations were most noticeable in East and Central 
European countries, associated with the end of the Cold War, in the UK, associated 
with the imposition of Poll Tax, and in France, Germany and elsewhere, associated 
with responses to the 2001-2 Eurozone and US recessions. This development is 
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reflected in Ponticelli and Voth’s analysis of the impact of austerity on a more general 
measure of social disorder (Ponticelli and Voth, 2011, Figure 1). 
CHART 1 ABOUT HERE 
More generally, disorder may reflect cultural shifts, issues of communication between 
nations and overall trends not captured in welfare state reforms. The European riots 
and demonstrations of 1968 or the Arab spring on 2011 were plausibly influenced by 
events elsewhere at the time, as well as by particular developments within societies. 
For this reason we include in the model the year to which the data refers. It also seems 
likely that the kind of overall differences in the general direction and social role of 
welfare summed up in the notion of welfare state regime may relate to legitimacy and 
dissent. All things being equal the ‘people’s home’ ideology of the social democratic 
ideal type may command stronger commitment and generate higher levels of 
legitimacy than corporatist or liberal welfare settlements. Regime type is also 
included in the model with nations grouped together following Esping-Andersen’s 
framework (1990), modified to take into account the identification of Mediterranean 
welfare state regime (Ferrera 2005). The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden) are categorised as Social Democratic, the European social 
insurance welfare states (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Switzerland) as 
corporatist, the Anglo-Saxon nations (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom and the United States) as Liberal and the Southern European regimes 
(Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) as Mediterranean. The former East European and 
the East Asian countries were not allocated to categories since the consensus among 
scholars on the classification of welfare systems in of these countries is weaker. 
In the first stage of the analysis, we examined the relationship between the combined 
measure of disorder and the variables measuring changes in private and state 
spending, employment protection and poverty (see Table 1). Changes in private 
spending and increases in poverty are both related positively, strongly and highly 
significantly to the kind of disorder that indicates declining legitimacy, as 
hypothesized. However the correlations between employment protection and state 
spending and disorder are low and not significant. This suggests that in itself changes 
in state spending and in the level of employment protection do not contribute to 
disorder of the kind under discussion. This may in part be due to the weakness of the 
employment protection variable in measuring the relevant aspect of restructuring. 
However it is suggestive evidence that greater strictness in this area may not be 
damaging to welfare state legitimacy. This interpretation is supported by the cross-
national evidence that work-ethic is widely valued and contributes to perceptions of 
deservingness identified by Van Oorschott (2006) and discussed earlier. 
Social democratic regime type relates strongly, significantly and negatively to 
disorder, probably reflecting widespread political commitment to social provision in 
these, the most generous and inclusive group of welfare states. The association 
between year (1990) and disorder noted in the discussion of Chart 1 is also confirmed. 
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The analysis: stage II 
In the second phase of the analysis a multivariate model was constructed to examine 
the effect of cuts and restructuring on political legitimacy, understood as a low level 
of disorder. The model included the four independent variables (changes in state 
spending, in private spending, in employment protection index and in poverty over 
each of the five five year periods), dummy variables for the years for which the 
dependent variable is measured, and regime type according to Esping-Andersen’s 
categorisation. The year 2000 is omitted to avoid the dummy variable trap of creating 
exact linear relationship between the variables. The modelling faces data limitations 
since the variables are only available for a limited number of observations for 
relatively few states. For this reason the data are pooled from 1980 to 2005, and the 
manifestations of disorder are treated as separate events in the model rather than as a 
time-series. The model chosen uses ordinary least squares regressions to maximise the 
use of the data measured at interval level. 
Table 2 shows the regression model. The tolerance statistics are all above 0.52, 
indicating limited multi-collinearity. The R squared statistic of .256 falls to .180 when 
adjusted to take account of the relatively small sample size. This shows reasonable 
explanatory power for a model of this type. The coefficients in the model generally 
follow the pattern of the zero-order correlations in Table 1, confirming the 
assumptions about multi-collinearity. Four points should be noted: public social 
spending is more strongly (and negatively) correlated with disorder when the other 
factors are taken into account, and becomes significant at the 6 per cent level. The 
negative relationship between social democratic regime type and disorder persists, but 
becomes rather less significant. The year 1990, which is significant in correlations in 
Table 1 ceases to be significant in the regression model, since other factors which 
coincide in that year have greater explanatory power. The employment protection 
variable, used to measure work-centredness in welfare reform, does not relate to 
disorder either in uni- or multi-variate analysis. It is unclear whether this reflects the 
relationship between work-centred policies and political legitimacy or the relative 
weakness of the conceptual link between reduced employment protection and work 
incentive reforms. The tension between adequate benefits and commitment to the 
work ethic is entrenched in public attitudes (van Oorschott 2006; Park et al., 2012, 
Figure 2.2). Individual responsibility to pursue paid work has been a strong theme in 
recent statements by leading politicians (Miliband 2012). 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The findings appear plausible and fit with Ponticelli and Voth’s finding that austerity 
programmes are associated with greater social instability. Increased poverty is the 
most important factor in national policy which tends to increase social disorder. 
Privatisation, which reduces access to services for most people, comes next. Cuts in 
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public spending are also associated with disorder. Social democratic welfare states are 
much less likely to experience overt dissent even when the variables discussed here 
are taken into account.  
IV. Discussion and Conclusions 
The analysis reported in this article is based on data from a period stretching back 
more than two decades before the current recession and round of welfare state cuts 
and restructuring. It suggests that, in the context of the other factors, cuts of the kind 
the UK government is pursuing play a real but not overwhelming role. It is the detail 
of the cuts and restructuring package that is of greater importance. The fact that the 
Coalition has chosen to implement cuts in a way that bears most heavily on the 
poorest groups plays the strongest role in relation to legitimacy. The aspect of 
restructuring that increases the role of the private sector is also significant. It is 
unclear whether the work-centredness of reforms has an effect, apart from its likely 
indirect impact in increasing poverty by denying vulnerable groups adequate benefits 
at a time of high unemployment. 
This analysis is exploratory and is affected by limitations to do with the data and the 
operationalisation of the variables.  The main weaknesses are three. First, the 
relatively small number of countries covered and relatively short time period for 
which comparable data is available give a limited number of data points for 
multivariate analysis. In view of these limitations, the research is pursued using a 
pooled rather than multi-level time-series regression. Secondly, the dependent 
variable may be influenced by factors other than welfare state restructuring. This 
gives rise to considerable ‘noise’ in the data. Thirdly, work-centredness is multi-
faceted, and the measure used reflects only one aspect of a complex process, so that 
the implications for this policy area are unclear. The fact that the analysis generates 
strong, significant and plausible results indicates that the effects being measured are 
sufficiently powerful to emerge, despite these imperfections. 
The research extends analysis of the impact of policies such as those pursued by the 
current government to include the effects on more abstract issues such as the 
contribution of social welfare to political legitimacy, as well as immediate questions 
of poverty, inequality and equal access to good quality services. It experiments with a 
way of conceptualising and measuring legitimacy that has been little used in 
quantitative work on state welfare, and may supplement the use of attitudinal 
measures in this field. It shows that increased poverty and privatisation are likely to 
have real effects in damaging social order and that spending cuts probably have an 
influence in the context of the other changes. The policies and traditions of social 
democratic welfare states provide some protection against these effects. 




- The increase in poverty, resulting from the combination of benefit cuts 
disproportionately affecting those on the lowest incomes and the public 
sector cut-backs which increase unemployment, is likely to have a real 
effect in generating social  disorder; 
- The policies which expand the role of the private sector are also likely to 
contribute in undermining legitimacy and social stability. The cut-backs 
themselves have a weaker, but still real, influence. It is the way they are 
channelled to bear on those already on low incomes that is of more 
importance. 
Considerable controversy surrounds the questions of whether cut-backs are necessary 
or desirable from an economic perspective. This analysis points out that, from the 
viewpoint of social order, it is not so much the fact of cut-backs in social spending as 
the groups affected and the detail of the restructuring of the welfare state that matter. 
This suggests that the Coalition might well be able to pursue its primary stated 
objective of eliminating the deficit without imposing cuts and privatisations in a way 
that is so injurious to the legitimacy of government. From the viewpoint of opposition 
parties, this finding strengthens the arguments for more egalitarian and inclusive 
social measures. From the viewpoint of abstract analysis, the implication is that 
Coalition is prepared to take risks in relation to legitimacy in order to secure 
additional objectives of weakening the bargaining power of employees and damaging 
the welfare state as one of the main working class gains of the past century. However 
the research also indicates that work-centredness in general does not necessarily 
damage the contribution of social policy to political legitimacy.
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 Table 1: Disorder, cuts, restructuring, regime and year (Pearson correlations) 
 
 Correlation 
5 year change in:  
Private social spending .221** 
Employment protection index .053 
Poverty .347** 












 1995 .078 
 2000 -.075 
2005 -.076 
N   141 
 
**= significant at 1 per cent level
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5 year change in: 
     
Private social spending .198* 2.399 .018 .221** .861 
Employment protection 
index 
.036 .439 .661 .053 .856 
% below 60% poverty 
line 
.411** 4.752 .000 .347** .784
Public social spending  
 
-.186
+ -1.939 .055 -.025 .639
Regime      
Social democratic -.180
+ -1.913 .058 -.192** .665
Corporatist .029 .316 .752 .076 .707
Liberal -.001 -.006 .995 .032 .661
Mediterranean 
 
.137 1.462 .146 .088  .663 
Year      
1985 .094 .928 .355 -.005 .574
1990 .149 1.443 .151 .184** .549
 1995 .065 .612 .542 .078 .521
 2000 omitted  
2005 .083 .788 .432 -.076 .531
R squared  0.256;   Adjusted R squared  0.180 
N = 141 
 
 
**= significant at 1 per cent level  
*= significant at 5 per cent level 
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i
 The 26 countries covered in the analysis are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States: data 
extracted on 09 Dec 2011. 
ii
 The variables are defined as: ‘Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service 
workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national 
government policies or authority.’; riots: ‘Any violent demonstration or clash of more 
than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force’; demonstrations: ‘Any peaceful 
public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or 
voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding 
demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.’ 
